

MULTI-SECTORAL COALITIONS AND POPULAR MOVEMENT PARTICIPATION

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ABSTRACT

The article focuses on varying protest intensities of social movement activists in an authoritarian political environment. Drawing on a sample of participants in El Salvador's El movimiento popular, the paper examines how structural location in the resistance movement's multi-sectoral organizational infrastructure shapes the level of participation. Those motivated by state repression and maintaining multiple or cross-sectoral organizational ties exhibited higher levels of protest participation. The findings suggest that more attention be given to how the multi-sectoral network structure of opposition coalitions induces micro-mobilization processes of individual participation in high-risk collective action.

INTRODUCTION

One striking feature of opposition movements that seriously challenge authoritarian regimes is the multi-sectoral nature of the protest coalition. That is, the groups threatening to replace or democratize the government come

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from more than one social class or sector. Although a broad coalition certainly appears as a powerful opponent to authoritarian rule, the cross-sectoral structure of the opposition may have consequences for the micro-level of individual activism. Understanding these micro-dynamics of participation in multi-sectoral oppositional movements contributes to the recent interest in explaining collective action processes in nondemocratic contexts (Boudreau, 1996, 2002; Mueller, 1999; Osa, 2001; Wiktorowicz, 2001; Aguirre, 2001; Wickham, 2002; Schock, 2005).

The existence of multi-sectoral-based movements under repressive regimes raises interesting challenges to conventional models of social movement participation. Protest participation under authoritarian conditions is a high-risk activity (McAdam, 1986; Loveman, 1998; Osa, 2003; Wood, 2003). Indeed, why would large numbers of ordinary people risk continuing their involvement in oppositional activities that may result in arrest, torture, or even death? Under what circumstances do individuals intensify their contributions to oppositional movements in such a dangerous political environment? The current study addresses these puzzling questions by examining participation among social movement activists in one nondemocratic setting.

By protest participation, I mean the variation in “intensity with which one is involved in movement activities” (Passy & Giugni, 2001, p. 125). This paper analyzes the level of *within* oppositional movement participation. Specifically, I use archival and testimonial literature and draw from a sample of former participants in El Salvador’s popular movement under authoritarian rule.

THE RISE OF EL SALVADOR’S MULTI-SECTORAL OPPOSITION, 1970–1981

This study centers on participation in El Salvador’s massive wave of disruptive protest in the late 1970s – the largest in Latin America by 1979–1980 (Harnecker, 1993, p. 16). Throughout the 1970s, a mass movement mushroomed in El Salvador. The movement’s infrastructure was constructed from a number of civic institutions and organizations in the labor, educational, and church sectors that were founded in the late 1960s during a period of political liberalization initiated by the military government (Almeida, 2003). By the early 1970s, the military regime closed back down and began to repress these newly formed civic organizations and their

memberships. At this time, surviving civil society groups emerged as the building blocks of an unprecedented network of opposition organizations that formed what became known as the *movimiento popular* (“the popular movement” or “the people’s movement”). By 1975, the popular movement had clearly entered a stage of political development witnessed in other broad struggles against repressive governments whereby the primary claims centered on the authoritarian nature of the state. Though sectoral-specific mobilizations continued through the decade around basic economic demands (e.g., price reductions of basic consumption items, wage increases, affordable land and housing), they were slowly becoming subsumed by political demands for the removal of the anti-democratic regime.

Already in 1974 and 1975, the popular movement consisted of a *multi-sectoral* struggle of students, teachers, peasants, workers, priests, nuns, and urban slum dwellers contesting an authoritarian military regime that had governed for 40 years (see Alas, 1982; Armstrong & Shenk, 1982; Dunkerley, 1982; Montgomery, 1982; Lungo, 1987). In fact, Williams and Walter (1997) note that Salvadorans experienced one of the longest enduring military regimes in twentieth century Latin America. By the mid-1970s, the leading oppositional organizations called for a wide coalition of rural and urban groups to unite in order to resist authoritarian governance.

Oppositional leaders and militants couched their mobilization appeals in the inclusive multi-sectoral movement identity of the “popular classes” whose boundaries stretched from the peasantry and urban slum dwellers to the middle classes (e.g., university students and school teachers). This widely inclusive mobilization appeal might appear improbable in most times and places, including El Salvador, and especially under authoritarian rule. However, by the mid-1970s, the in-place multi-sectoral organizational structure of the movement shaped the pattern of social interaction among activists in a manner that made the broad mobilization appeals to participate in high-risk oppositional activities plausible to large number of people as witnessed in the dramatic upsurge of mass disruptive protests in the late 1970s (see Fig. 1).

The popular movement demanded democratic rule and the removal of military state managers. The opposition sustained mass protest campaigns, including large demonstrations, strikes, building occupations, and land seizures against the national government until about the third quarter of 1980 (Stanley, 1996). In 1981, the country spiraled into civil war as mass protest became too dangerous and guerrilla armies expanded in more remote rural zones and launched their “final offensive” (Brockett, 1993; Stanley, 1996).




Fig. 1. Mass Disruptive Protest, 1962–1981. Source: *La Prensa Gráfica* Daily Coverage 1962–1981.

STATE REPRESSION AND THE AUTHORITARIAN POLITICAL ENVIRONMENT

We know relatively little about popular movement participation in authoritarian political contexts. This may be partially attributed to the difficulty of conducting research and rigorously collecting data in such dangerous political settings (Wood, 2003). Two distinctions differentiating authoritarian contexts from more democratic ones are the political exclusivity of the regime (Goodwin, 2001) and the level of risk faced by movement

participants (McAdam, 1986; Loveman, 1998; Wood, 2003). In El Salvador in the 1970s and early 1980s, citizens were denied the right to elect their own political representatives, while activists literally risked exile, imprisonment, torture, and death for participating in oppositional political activities (Stanley, 1996). By the early 1970s, state security forces already had invaded Catholic-run peasant training centers, universities, and labor unions offices (Morales Velado, 1988). In the mid-1970s, a clear pattern of “disappearing” real and alleged popular movement activists emerged. During the late 1970s, El Salvador was notorious for human rights abuses in the international community as state-sponsored and para-military violence increased to extraordinary levels. By the early 1980s (1980–1982), state-sponsored repression killed on average hundreds of citizens per month (Stanley, 1996).

Protest is such a high-risk activity for individual activists in authoritarian contexts largely because such regimes apply or threaten to apply repressive measures (e.g., police surveillance, arrest, torture, etc.) against opponents of their rule, while the citizenry lacks any *legal* recourse to protect itself from civil rights violations (Osa, 2003). Interestingly, recent work on movement–state dynamics in authoritarian contexts finds that repressive measures act as threats and at times *increase* the level of oppositional activity and popular contention (Goldstone & Tilly, 2001). Hence, acts of state repression may be a critical factor in igniting further protest (Goodwin, 2001). Indeed, a number of empirical studies outside of advanced industrialized democracies have shown positive effects of state repression on aggregate and group-specific protest activities (Olivier, 1991; Khawaja, 1993; Foran, 1993; Opp, 1994; Francisco, 1995; Rasler, 1996; Loveman, 1998; Moore, 1998; Schock, 1999; Beissinger, 2001; Jenkins & Schock, 2004). In the next section, I discuss the conditions associated with state repression escalating the level of *individual* protest participation.

State repression may generate moral outrage and suddenly imposed grievances for individual regime opponents (White, 1989; McAdam, Tarrow, & Tilly, 2001; Wood, 2003) – such as by witnessing a repressive event or experiencing the loss of a loved one due to state violence (Brockett, 1993, p. 475). Coercive state behavior breaks public convictions about expected state–civil society relations – especially when the repressive acts are way out of proportion to the types of demands and claims protesters pursue (Goldstone, 1998). Activists can use state repressive acts as empirical affirmations of the unworthiness of authoritarian officeholders to rule. These motivational appeals to participate in future protest actions in response to state coercive measures are often made within organizations and across inter-connected social sectors.

In addition, repressive acts by governments grant occasions for emotionally charged focal events (Karklins & Petersen, 1993) to rally individuals such as funeral processions and homage ceremonies for fallen victims of state violence (Pfaff & Yang, 2001). Such activities provide the physical locations where sentiments of moral shock and outrage are shared collectively (Jasper, 1997; Wood, 2003). In nondemocratic contexts, these types of events take on especially important meaning, given that they provide a short-term protective umbrella for the opposition to congregate and express dissent as well as demand contributions from fellow activists in future rounds of mobilization. For example, in El Salvador in the 1970s, a popular chant at funeral processions motivating future collective action was, “porque el color de sangre jamás se olvida” (because the color of blood one never forgets). In another example, a widely circulating homage song (*A Rutilio Grande*) composed in 1977 immediately following the assassination of the Jesuit priest – Father Rutilio Grande from the Aguilares/El Paisnal region, north of San Salvador – states in the chorus, “the blood that has fallen here continues shouting in the veins of everyone that is also struggling.”

In short, studies that find (or theoretically predict) positive effects of state repression on protest behavior suggest that the repressive acts provide an *interest* for individuals to participate in collective action. That interest centers on the perception that the sooner the authoritarian regime is removed or democratized via popular collective action, the nearer that citizens will be safe from harm (Goldstone & Tilly, 2001). Yet at the same time, it raises the level of risk of participating in subsequent collective action, given that the state has now shown less restraint in employing repressive measures against opponents. The micro-organizational context of the activist may very well determine if she or he will lower or raise their participation threshold, given the likelihood of future coercive actions by the authoritarian state.

Although state repression may at times be a powerful motivational force sufficient for increasing levels of protest participation against authoritarian states, it is largely the organizational context of opposition that provides the individual a shared collective understanding of acts of state-sponsored coercion. More specifically, organizations set boundaries for a group-specific normative setting. Organizational members come under the influence of other organizational participants and vice versa (Kim & Bearman, 1997). Thus, in addition to taking into account the influence of state repression, the organizational dimensions of individual opposition should also be considered.

Figure 2 provides an example of a public appeal for mobilization that shows the dynamic between repression and organizational participation.



Fig. 2. El Diario de Hoy, Jueves 29 de julio de 1976.

It is an open call from the largest multi-sectoral broker organization (MSBO) in El Salvador during the 1970s – the Bloque Popular Revolucionario (BPR). In the announcement, the BPR invites people to participate in an homage march and rally on July 30, 1976 to pay respect and honor for over 20 university students killed by security forces during a pacific street march on this same date in 1975. The BPR lists in the invitation all of its affiliated popular organizations from multiple organized social sectors, including the peasant sector (FECCAS and UTC), neighborhood-based slum dwellers (UPT), university students (UR-19), high school students (MERS), and school teachers (ANDES-21 de Junio). Hence, an act of state repression against a single social sector (university students in 1975) is responded to one year later (July 1976) with an invitation to join in a multi-sectoral homage ceremony and demonstration. Below, the organizational dimensions of individual participation are analyzed in relation to these kinds of persuasive appeals to fashion a multi-sectoral oppositional movement in authoritarian settings.

THE MULTI-SECTORAL NATURE OF OPPOSITION IN AUTHORITARIAN SETTINGS

One common property of oppositional movements struggling under authoritarian regimes is that they are multi-sectoral. That is, the opposition is

usually a loose coalition of multiple social groups (Goldstone, 1994; Schock, 2005). It is likely that no single group in civil society is powerful enough on its own to sustain resistance to a strong and repressive regime. Authoritarian states also unintentionally create multiple oppositional groups by committing repressive acts against more than one sector (Goodwin, 2001). Hence, a repressive regime policy has a recursive relationship to the breadth of the oppositional coalition by radicalizing previously inactive or semi-active sectors by carrying out outrageous acts of violence. For example, in El Salvador by the early 1970s, the government security forces had already perpetrated human rights violations against reform-minded civic organizations in multiple social sectors, including the church, peasant cooperatives, trade unions, teachers' associations, and the national university, eventuating in greater anti-government fervor and appeals to mobilization in each of these affected sectors.

Indeed, major multi-sectoral broker organizations (MSBOs) viewed the increasing state-backed violence as assisting in their daunting task of forging multi-group alliances. For instance, in a political pamphlet released in March of 1975 by the *Frente de Acción Popular Unificada (FAPU)*, the second largest multi-sectoral organization, FAPU explicitly views state coercion as bringing disparate social groups together for common purposes.

In political terms, inside of FAPU there are diverse organizations and sectors that represent peasants, day laborers, middle class intellectuals (teachers, students, priests, etc.) and industrial workers. How does FAPU view it is going to be possible to coordinate the anti-fascist struggle given this diversity of organizations?... FAPU considers that in the actual political conditions the country is living, where all the popular sectors are suffering the harsh effects of the crisis and the miserable consequences of fascist escalation (repression, abusive and authoritarian laws, disrespect for human rights, etc.; IT IS POSSIBLE TO UNIFY DISTINCT ORGANIZATIONS AND CLASS SECTORS IN ORDER TO REACH CONCRETE AGREEMENTS AND POLITICAL COMMITMENTS TO ACHIEVE A COMMON OBJECTIVE: to defeat fascism" (FAPU, 1975, p. 3; emphasis in the original).

In fact, the three major multi-sectoral organizations in El Salvador (FAPU, BPR, and Ligas Populares 28 de Febrero (LP-28)) date their exact founding to major acts of state-sponsored exclusion or violence (Almeida, 2003). FAPU formed in May of 1974 immediately following fraudulent national parliamentary and local elections. The BPR formally constituted itself in the days after the July 30, 1975 university student massacre mentioned above. The LP-28 named itself after a major act of state violence. LP-28 formed within months of the February 28, 1977 massacre of an estimated 50–100

demonstrators in downtown San Salvador protesting electoral fraud in the recently held presidential elections.

Although a single social sector may be prominent in the oppositional coalition as a vanguard that brings other groups into the alliance (e.g., Gdansk shipyard workers in Poland in the early 1980s), *multi-sectoralness* does seem to be the standard for the major opposition movements resisting authoritarian rule in the late twentieth and early twenty-first centuries (Foran, 2003) – especially those struggles that reach a stage of seriously challenging the legitimacy of their respective governments. In Chile, the Catholic Church, organized labor, students, and shantytown dwellers formed the core of the opposition to the military regime in the early to mid-1980s (Schneider, 1995). Similar kinds of broad oppositional alliances were found in Brazil's popular movement against military rule in the late 1960s and 1970s (Moreira Alves, 1985). The oppositional movement in Nicaragua struggling against the Somoza dictatorship in the late 1970s included students, Christian base communities, peasants, workers, and a sizable portion of the business community (Samandú and Jansen, 1982; Booth, 1982; Everingham, 1996). The 1970s in Guatemala also produced a sizable multi-sectoral opposition movement (e.g., between students, trade unionists, and slum dwellers) against military rulers, especially during the General Kjell Laugerud García government (1974–1978) (Figueroa Ibarra, 1991). In one of the largest mass urban uprisings against an authoritarian regime in South America, public sector employees aligned with automobile workers and university students in the industrial city of Córdoba, Argentina in May 1969 to rebel against the repressive measures of the General Onganía government (Brennan & Gordillo, 1996).

The multi-sectoral pattern of opposition is also observed beyond Latin American authoritarian regimes. The opposition to apartheid in South Africa in the 1970s and 1980s was also composed of a cross-sectoral coalition in the United Democratic Front (UDF) (Seidman, 1994; Wood, 2000; Schock, 2005). The amalgamation of groups leading to the overthrow of the Pahlavi dynasty in Iran in the late 1970s counted university students, clerics, merchants, and organized labor (Foran, 1993; Kurzman, 2004). In the 1980s, popular movements confronting authoritarian regimes in the Philippines and Burma were also constructed from alliances between multiple social groups (Schock, 1999; Boudreau, 2002). This was also the configuration of opposition in the former Soviet Union (Fish, 1995) and several of the Eastern European rebellions at the end of the 1980s (Opp, Voss & Gern, 1995; Pfaff, 1996; Mueller, 1999; Bunce, 1999; Glenn, 2001; Osa, 2003). In most of the above cases, the coalitions were made up of dozens of

inter-connected organizations. For our interests, the individual variation in ties to the multi-sectoral coalition and its impact on levels of activism needs to be elaborated more precisely.

El Salvador followed a similar path in its broad opposition to military rule. Figure 3 charts the *multi-sectoral* organizational infrastructure of El Salvador's popular movement achieved by the mid-1970s. Individual members of the popular organizations participated in protest activities either within their own sector (e.g., in a student organization) and/or multiple sectors (e.g., in a student and neighborhood association). Multi-sectoral broker organizations (MSBOs) represented groupings of popular organizations from multiple social sectors (e.g., the BPR, FAPU, LP-28). The MSBOs were either founded by or drew closer to clandestine revolutionary organizations over time. The underground clandestine organizations consisted of small hermetic groups of the most dedicated or radicalized activists.

THE STRUCTURING OF A MULTI-SECTORAL OPPOSITION

The convergence of mobilization appeals with a movement identity – “a collection of groups and individuals [that] perceive themselves as a force in explicit pursuit of social change” (Jasper, 1997, p. 86) – has been shown to be a powerful force for explaining both recruitment to specific high-risk protest campaigns (McAdam & Paulsen, 1993; Nepstad & Smith, 1999) and the level of intensity of resistance in subsequent collective action (Gould, 1995). Given the multi-sectoral nature of opposition to authoritarian regimes, it may be imperative for organizational leaders in such contexts to attempt to fashion a multi-group movement identity to sustain popular contention. Indeed, a multi-sectoral movement identity may be the cement that holds the diverse coalition together. A single social movement or oppositional group alone is unlikely by itself to launch a successful campaign or survive without the presence of other important social actors. At the same time, a cross-sectoral call for political action under authoritarian conditions is a tall order. Under what conditions do people actually respond to this catch-all appeal given the dangerous political setting?

It is precisely the *multi-sectoralness* that gives the opposition its power. At the micro-level of individual activism, when multiple groups oppose a regime it provides the potential participant a sense of an efficacious movement with broad support across civil society. In such contexts of broad




Fig. 3. Multi-Sectoral Organizational Structure of El Salvador's Popular Movement.

opposition, the more a person is structurally connected to multiple organizations and sectors of the opposition, the more credible is the call for protest participation in a popular movement. Hence, even within an oppositional movement there is considerable individual variation in the degree that the activist is connected to multiple organizations and social sectors.

There are a variety of ways in which oppositional movements can try to construct a multi-sectoral movement identity of “we” (the popular movement) versus “it” (the authoritarian regime) (Klandermans, 1997; Mansbridge, 2001, p. 238). These strategies range from the informal, such as distributing propaganda, sponsoring festive gatherings and cultural events with protest music,¹ to the formal, such as constructing a network of organizations in a way that promotes cross-group communications, mutual awareness, obligation, and solidarity (Gould, 1995; Morris & Braine, 2001, p. 31). An illustration of a multi-sectoral appeal using popular music is found in the following translated Salvadoran protest song from around the 1979–1980 period at the height of the popular movement. The song makes direct appeals to at least five social sectors (i.e., urban labor, peasants, shantytown districts, students/teachers, church, and potentially human rights groups).

Even though they quiet the voice, we will continue shouting,
 We will continue singing for freedom
 Even though they kill people, we will begin anew
 We will organize ourselves for freedom
 Through the factories, in the cornfields, through the shantytowns and schools
 God continues shouting, God keeps demanding
 “Liberation,” “Liberation”
 God continues shouting, God keeps demanding
 “Liberation,” “Liberation”
 Even though they torture the prisoner and break their bones
 We will continue following their example for freedom
 Even though they kill a priest, we will continue to follow Christ, the blessings of freedom
 Through the factories, in the cornfields, through the shantytowns and schools
 God continues shouting, God keeps demanding
 “Liberation,” “Liberation”
 God continues shouting, God keeps demanding
 “Liberation,” “Liberation”
 Even though they surround the villages and dislodge the
 occupied factories we will not stop for freedom...

But under what conditions do people actually respond to these persuasive pleas to participate or continue participating in high-risk collective action? Gould (1995) notes that one of the most important functions of formal

organizations (e.g., associations, social clubs, labor unions, cooperatives, etc.) in relation to participation in collective action is to greatly raise the scale of potential movement identity formation – well beyond what would be possible for individuals limited by informal organizational ties (e.g., in a single neighborhood, village, or workplace). This scale expansion is made possible by the greater level of shared recognition of a common fate and norms of obligation that organizations supply by connecting previously isolated individuals to one another that are experiencing similar circumstances (i.e., state persecution) vis-à-vis the authoritarian government (*ibid.*).

The ability of dissident entrepreneurs to make successful mobilization appeals across multiple social sectors hinges largely on the degree of organizational connectedness between the sectors that are included in the call for participation (in this case, the “popular” sectors). Moreover, how the individual activist is structurally embedded within this inter-organizational network will largely determine the plausibility of the multi-sectoral appeal and sense of duty to participate in the high-risk protest activities of the popular movement.²

Individual involvement in El Salvador’s opposition movement in the 1970s was nearly synonymous with membership in at least one popular organization (Armstrong & Shenk, 1982, p. 135). In addition, individual organizational membership varied along at least three important dimensions: (1) number of popular organization affiliations; (2) number of social sectors in which the activist enlisted in a popular organization; and (3) a sense of membership in one of the MSBOs (such as the BPR, FAPU, LP-28). Higher levels of organizational embeddedness along each of these dimensions should lead to greater levels of manifest protest activity. Each type of organizational membership creates normative boundaries and increases obligations to participate in oppositional activity. Moreover, it is the individual that is connected across multiple sectors that more likely experiences the strongest sense of obligation to contribute to the popular movement.

Popular Organizational Affiliations

Formal and semi-formal organizations act as collective vehicles for mobilizing individuals and articulating claims on behalf of constituencies to powerholders (Wilson & Orum, 1976). Civic and political organizations offer individual participants a sense of personal efficacy (McAdam & Paulsen, 1993; Gould, 1993). Each organizational affiliation pulls activists

further away from countervailing pressures that may impinge on individual movement activity such as relationships with persons outside the movement and/or opposed to movement participation (McAdam & Paulsen, 1993; Kim & Bearman, 1997; Gould, 2003; McAdam, 2003).³ Cross-cutting pulls on individual activists would likely be even stronger in nondemocratic contexts given the high-risk nature of participation. Nonetheless, in authoritarian settings, each tie to an oppositional organization makes it more likely that the individual will come under the direct or indirect authority of more militant cadre or activists belonging to clandestine revolutionary parties.⁴ Boudreau (2002), for instance, found that mass actions such as strikes and demonstrations against the Burmese military government in the late 1980s were sparked by underground militants that exercised influence over above-ground opposition associations.

In addition, organizations provide important boundary-setting processes whereby the individual member's behavior increasingly converges with the normative obligations of their respective organization. In authoritarian contexts, this alignment process often takes place during internal organizational ceremonies and rituals (e.g., meetings, study groups, funerals for fallen activists, etc.). Such ceremonies grant occasions for intense face-to-face interaction creating focused attention and shared definitions of the political situation where organizational in-group/out-group boundaries are constructed and reinforced. Most importantly, these are locations where activists are most likely to have their interests reaffirmed to continue resisting the repressive government (e.g., "the days of tyranny are almost over") and obliged by normative pressures to make individual contributions through active protest participation.

In brief, in nondemocratic political environments the more organizational ties one has to the movement's organizational infrastructure, the more they come under group-specific obligations to contribute to removing the authoritarian regime resulting in greater rates of protest participation. This proposition is also consistent with the ethnographic literature from El Salvador, whereby many of the rank-and-file activists and middle-level cadre affiliated with more than one popular organization (see Harnecker, 1993). Moreover, multiple organizational affiliations strengthen the individual's duty to be an active opponent of the government and pull her/him away from countervailing influences and pressures against participation. Each additional organizational affiliation should increasingly lower the individual's threshold for activism (Petersen, 2001).

Nevertheless, membership in individual popular organizations does not ensure cross-sectoral participation. The nature and type of organizational

membership must also be analyzed in relation to the multi-sectoral appeals of the movement. Each individual popular organization formed raises the potential scale of mobilization by connecting previously unconnected individuals *within the same* sector (e.g., students across university departments, peasants across villages, and workers across factories) (Gould, 1995). At the micro-mobilization level, being structurally connected to other social sectors opposing the regime likely further provides interests and obligations to increase the level of individual protest participation.

Organizational Membership in Multiple Sectors

Another important dimension of organizational membership is the degree to which the individual is organizationally involved in more than one social sector. Is the activist participating only as a student or is she also a member of a labor sector organization? These cross-sectoral ties give activists a boost in confidence that citizens beyond a single social sector are opposing the regime (Brockett, 1993). Indeed, witnessing participation across sectors may be the most important evidence available to individual activists that there is widespread and organized opposition to the government, which likely raises success expectations leading to higher rates of participation (Lichbach, 1995). This kind of critical information transmission would be less accessible and credible to activists only organized within a single social sector. In addition, there may be more occasions to protest while organizationally active in multiple sectors.

The extraordinarily high population density of El Salvador also facilitated the capacity of individuals to organizationally participate in multiple social sectors. In the 1970s, El Salvador had a population density of 245 people/km² – substantially much higher than any other country in Latin America (Huezo Selva, 1980). In ecological terms this meant that workers, peasants, students, and teachers were not that far removed from each other.

Beginning in the mid-1960s, school teachers were organized nationally in an association (ANDES-21 de Junio) and remained in constant interaction with students and their parents from diverse backgrounds (i.e., peasant, worker, and shantytown neighborhoods) (Almeida, 2003). During these same years (1965–1972), the size of the labor union network also grew dramatically in the largest cities and ports of the country (Lungo, 1987). Finally, the Salvadoran Catholic Church, following the social doctrine of Vatican II (1962–1965) and Medellín (1968), initiated a number of social service programs in the late 1960s and early 1970s (Nepstad, 1996) that

brought Catholic middle school, high school, and university students into sustained social interaction with urban shantytown neighborhoods and poor peasant villages (Henriquez, 1988). The urban–rural alliance of oppositional organizations also benefited from the existence of large concentrations of church-organized peasants in the 1970s that were easily within an hour’s drive of the capital (e.g., in the municipalities of Aguilares, Ciudad Arce, Cojutepeque, El Paisnal, Guazapa, Quetzaltepeque, Suchitoto, Tecoluca, etc.). All of the above conditions favored cross-sectoral participation in El Salvador’s popular movement.

Testimonial literature from individuals in the popular movement frequently reports the organizational participation of activists in multiple social sectors (Herrera, 1983; Alegría, 1987; Harnecker, 1993; Shayne, 2004). Some of this cross-sectoral participation included acts of solidarity between sectors during a particular protest campaign – especially in cases of occupations of land or buildings where the occupiers needed a steady inflow of supplies to maintain a prolonged protest. For example, a former member of the *Universitarios Revolucionarios – 19 de Junio (UR-19)* (a university organization) reported in a field interview the importance of cross-sectoral solidarity between students and urban workers during factory occupations in the late 1970s.

There was a time in which the entire free trade zone – along the Boulevard del Ejército/ Panamerican Highway on the way to San Miguel – that all the factories in the entire zone were taken over by the Bloque, FAPU, LP-28, all of these factories were occupied.... The work of the rank-and-file members of the UR-19 during the day was to go out and gather items that would help the strikers like food and sheets. Then, in the night we would go and stay at the factories with the workers and deliver the collected supplies to the occupiers so they were able to eat (author interview, January 18, 1999, Ciudad Universitaria, San Salvador).

Beyond these critical solidarity acts between sectors was the actual organizational participation of activists in multiple sectors. For instance, a member of the *Frente de Acción Universitaria (FAU)*, a university-based student protest organization, recounts her oppositional organizing in the mid-1970s across multiple sectors as follows:

I did my first organizing projects with peasants in Sonsonate together with Silvia [a trade union organizer], and this is where I began to become familiar with how the peasants really are ready, aware, with much desire to cooperate in the struggle. While I was doing this work in Sonsonate, I was also studying in the National University of El Salvador. In the university I was participating in student activities as a representative, and in addition to all this, I was participating in my neighborhood where we formed a base committee in which I had the position of the general secretary (Herrera, 1983, p. 49).

By the above account, this activist was in face-to-face contact with at least four social sectors participating in the opposition coalition (peasants, unionists, university students, and neighborhood residents), while at the same time having organizational membership in at least two sectors (university and neighborhood). This kind of multi-sectoral participation would seem to deepen the level of organizational commitment to the larger opposition movement and repel the individual activist from competing alternative loyalties inhibiting protest participation. In addition, by her cross-sectoral ties, the activist received first-hand empirical verification that peasants were willing to contribute to the opposition and could convey that information back to university and neighborhood-based organizations in the city that did not have ready access to this evidence. Her active participation in protest events would help render the credibility of her accounts of other sectors willing to participate.

Multi-Sectoral Broker Organizations (MSBOs)

Some scholars of social movement participation have argued that we need to move beyond the importance of counts of organizational ties to better specify the *nature* of organizational affiliation and its impact on protest participation (Gould, 1991; Marwell & Oliver, 1993; McAdam & Paulsen, 1993; Nepstad & Smith, 1999, p. 35). One fundamental difference in the *type* of organizational affiliation in El Salvador was between individual popular organizations and MSBOs. Organizations that bring previously disconnected groups and organizations into communication or alliance with one another are broker organizations (Diani, 2003). In the context of multi-sectoral oppositional movements, broker organizations bring at least two previously unconnected social sectors (e.g., students and peasants) together to sustain protest campaigns. In El Salvador, these types of MSBOs emerged in the mid- 1970s.⁵ The MSBOs brought together organizational units from several social sectors (e.g., peasants, students, workers, teachers, slum dwellers) under a single organizational umbrella (see Fig. 3).

The largest and most potent of these MSBOs in El Salvador were the FAPU, the BPR, and the LP-28.⁶ They each promoted a multi-sectoral movement identity by their self-entitlements (which all included the term “popular”), organizing strategies, and emblems and symbols invoked during protest campaigns (e.g., the BPR appeal in Fig. 2). Individual activists from different social sectors would march in unity behind the banners of their respective MSBOs during demonstrations.

Identifying as a member of an MSBO meant viewing oneself as connected to individuals in constituent popular organizations from other social sectors (e.g., students, peasants, slum dwellers, workers, etc.). Thus, members of MSBOs were more likely in interaction with movement participants from several social sectors. These individuals were more prone to share sentiments of a common fate and solidarity with social sectors other than their own. A self-identifying member of an MSBO would have a lower threshold for participating in various protest activities in the sense that they are carrying through on the multi-sectoral appeals called for by the opposition as well as personally experiencing the participation of other social sectors. Not only would a self-identifying member of an MSBO be under the strongest normative pressures to participate, but they would also be likely to place pressure on less enthusiastic others to contribute. Thus, they would need to “lead by example” and make a presence at most major protest events.

Testimonial literature from El Salvador again provides some oral history evidence of the strength of membership in an MSBO on protest participation. A fellow activist recounts the organizational participation of his fallen comrade and lover, “Eugenia,” a female Catholic University Student and founding member of the MSBO the BPR in the mid-1970s:

She was a part of all that was happening and at the same time occupied in helping in the countryside. She participated in the Bloc's [BPR's] formation in consequence of her work with the peasants, and was a guiding force in the Rural Workers' Federation (FTC) which, as I've already said, is a union of FECCAS and the UTC... During 1975 and 1976 she remained entirely immersed in this grassroots work. She was always to be found in the provinces... She covered a wide number of districts and many tiny villages. Hers was a highly hush-hush enterprise, one that demanded a lot of patience, yet at the same time she was visibly active and combative during our mobilizations. There wasn't a single mass demonstration in which she didn't participate (Alegria, 1987, pp. 66–67).

Eugenia is a prime example of a multi-sectoral activist brokering the participation of several popular organizations in the opposition. Her multi-sectoral organizational membership status resulted in her high participation in manifest protest activities as she led by example. Her “hush-hush enterprise” of working with rural worker organizations appears similar to Boudreau's (2002) observations of the opposition in Burma, where more militant cadre placed influence on members of the more open and above-ground organizations to participate in demonstrations against the military.

Figure 4 summarizes the above predictions about structural embeddedness in oppositional networks and the level of participation in high-risk collective action against authoritarian regimes. Those who are members of zero to one popular organizations have the highest participation thresholds.




Fig. 4. Protest Participation Thresholds under Authoritarian Regimes.

They are more likely to face cross-cutting pressures against participation with many of their everyday social interactions involving movement outsiders, and will be less under the authority and influence of high-participation others. Those participating in multiple popular organizations have a medium-level participation threshold. Each organizational membership provides a bounded setting of inter-personal interactions in which mutual encouragement and obligation act on the individual activist's interest to resist a repressive government. More popular organizational affiliations also increases the likelihood of exposure to the direct or indirect influence of more militant cadre that demand the individual or their respective organization increases contributions to the opposition. Finally, cross-sectoral and multi-sectoral broker organizational memberships have the lowest protest participation thresholds. These members need to "lead by example" in order to have moral suasion in convincing others to participate in a movement in which they have personally witnessed the willingness of other sectors to contribute.

RESEARCH DESIGN

Research on political involvement under exclusive authoritarian regimes creates particular obstacles for social movement scholars. Since systematic

and large-scale participation research is nearly impossible under a repressive government, analysts must make tough choices. Two of the most common alternatives are either (1) to interview the exile community outside the country (Kurzman, 1996; Aguirre, 2001) or (2) wait until the regime democratizes and then interview the participants (Opp et al., 1995; Shayne, 2004). I chose a combination of these two approaches.⁷

As part of a larger research project on social movements in El Salvador, an anonymous field survey was implemented in 1997. The questionnaire queried 220 Salvadoran social movement participants in the 1970–1981 period about a range of influences on becoming involved in popular organizations, level of participation, and demographic variables. The requisite for inclusion in this study was that the respondent acknowledged participating in El Salvador's popular movement between 1970 and 1981 (based on the introduction to the questionnaire and subsequent responses to items regarding organizational membership and protest participation). All those that identified as joining the popular movement after 1981 (when the civil war was well underway) were excluded. After removing cases with missing item responses, the final sample counted 186 respondents. The questionnaire was tested in Los Angeles, California with Salvadoran popular movement participants (largely immigrants to the United States during El Salvador's civil war in the 1980s).

A purposive sampling design was used targeting particular agencies and organizations likely to have contacts with former Salvadoran political activists from the popular movement. Between November 1997 and June 1998, the first wave of surveys was administered through three Salvadoran social service agencies in Los Angeles and San Francisco, California. Each social service agency has over 15 years of experience working with Salvadoran immigrants (many fleeing political persecution) (Stanley, 1987) and holds on-going relations with many participants in the popular movement. A second wave of surveys was implemented in El Salvador between July 1998 and March of 1999. In El Salvador, nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), unions, and political parties with political roots in the 1970s' popular movement were approached to have their affiliates complete the survey. The field survey was realized in the municipalities of San Salvador, Mejicanos, Ayutuxtepeque, Soyapango, Suchitoto, Meanguera, and Chalatenango – the geographical regions where the popular movement drew some of its strongest support in the period under investigation. In the final sample, 27% of respondents (51) were in California and 73% (135) resided in El Salvador. Individuals from peasant, working-class, and middle-class backgrounds were included in the study in nearly equal proportions.

VARIABLES

Dependent Variable

Protest Intensity was measured by the question: in which activities did you participate between 1970 and 1981? Followed by a list of 12 different protest tactics employed by the popular movement ranging from rallies and street marches to occupations of public buildings, factories, churches, and land and an open “other” category. The tactical categories used are historically grounded in the actual movement representing the dominant forms of protest used between 1970 and 1981 (especially in the late 1970s; see Fig. 1). The mean number of tactics reported by respondents was 7.0. In order for an individual to receive even a moderate protest intensity score (i.e., above 4), they would have to indicate participating in protest forms that only became part of the protest repertoire in El Salvador between 1977 and 1981 after the major MSBOs were established, such as various forms of occupations of buildings and land.

Independent Variables

Perceived State Repression

The state repression variable was constructed based on the perception of governmental repression by the respondents as a motivation to participate in the movement. The question asked respondents how much influence military repression had in their decision to initially join the popular movement – ranging from 0 (no influence) to 4 (very much influence). The distribution of responses to this item was heavily skewed with 90% of respondents stating “much influence” or “very much influence.” Given this negatively skewed distribution, a dummy variable was constructed to better measure the variation in state repression. Those reporting the highest level of governmental repression in their decision to participate were coded 1 (i.e., high repression) (57%) and all others were coded 0 (i.e., lower repression) (43%).

Popular Organization Ties

The organizational affiliations variable of *number of organizational ties* was operationalized by asking movement respondents which of the 1970s popular organizations they participated in out of a list of 36 challenger organizations and an open-ended “other” category. The list represents the multi-organizational field of El Salvador’s popular movement in the 1970s

(see Dunkerley, 1982; Armstrong & Shenk, 1982). All 36 popular organizations are listed in the appendix. The number of popular organizations that each respondent identified was totaled for a final organizational affiliations score. The mean number of popular organization affiliations was 2.9.

Multi-Sectoral Breadth

Sectoral breadth was measured by asking respondents in what type of popular organization they participated in between 1970–1981 from a list of seven sectors (church, student, teacher, labor, neighborhood, peasant, cultural) and an open “other” category (e.g., human rights). These were the major sectors from which opposition developed against the regime in the period under study (see Fig. 3).

Multi-Sectoral Broker Organizations (MSBOs)

Multi-sectoral broker organizational affiliation was measured by a dummy variable indicating if the respondent identified as a member of one of the multi-sectoral organizations (i.e., BPR, FAPU, LP-28) (coded 1) or not (coded 0). MSBOs focused on unifying and coordinating actions between different popular organizations (e.g., between slum dwellers and students, school teachers and peasants, etc.) (see Fig. 3).

Demographic Variables

Control variables of *education*, *gender*, *age joined the movement* and *year joined the movement* are also included in the regression equations in Tables 1 and 2. *Education* was measured from the point of joining the popular movement, ranging from 0 (no education) to 7 (postbachelors degree education).⁸ *Gender* was measured as a dichotomous dummy variable with a value of 0 assigned to men and 1 for women. 24% of respondents were female, slightly under their representation in the movement (see Luciak, 2001).

Age joined the movement was measured as the self-reported age when respondent began participating in the popular movement. The mean age of joining the movement was 21, testifying to the youthful nature of the opposition. *Year joined the movement* was measured by the number of years the individual had participated in the movement prior to 1982. The median was 6 years, meaning that half of respondents joined the movement in 1975 or after. Descriptive statistics for all variables are located in Table A.1.

RESULTS

Table 1 presents the coefficients from an OLS regression model estimating the level of protest intensity. The demographic variables of education level, gender, age joined movement, and years spent in movement were not associated with higher levels of participation in oppositional activities. As predicted, perceived state repression increased the level of reported protest participation. This supports research in other nondemocratic contexts that finds state repression as increasing the level of contention by individual challengers (Goodwin, 2001). Perceived state repression provides an extremely poignant motivational interest in increasing protest participation against the government. The sooner the government is removed/democratized, the sooner that egregious human rights violations will diminish.

Also, in Table 1 the organizational ties variable is positively related to increasing levels of protest intensity. The more organizational ties to the movement's network structure, the more the activist participated in high-risk collective action. Each additional organizational membership provided a normative context where mutual support and obligation compel the individual to keep contributing to the resistance. Every popular organizational affiliation also increases the likelihood that the individual activist becomes exposed to more radical militants that demand higher levels of participation.

Table 2 adds the multi-sectoral nature of organizational membership by introducing the variables *organizational sectors* and *MSBO*. Activists that enlisted in organizations across social sectors demonstrated increased levels of protest intensity. Also, those that identified as a member of an MSBO had higher rates of participation than those that did not. These popular movement enthusiasts and militants needed to convince others to participate in part by showing their willingness to engage in as many protest events as feasibly possible. In their movement roles as cross-sectoral and multi-sectoral activists they demonstrated their militancy to other would be participants by contributing beyond their fair share (Goldstone, 1994).

Interestingly, the effects of state repression and popular organizational ties weaken when the multi-sectoral variables are added to the equation in Table 2, but still exhibit a significant and positive influence on the level of protest. The above models support recent developments in the individual protest participation literature that the *types* of organizational membership may be equally or more important than the number of organizational ties. In authoritarian contexts this may mean that cross-sectoral membership plays a critical role in both sharing information of widespread resistance and

Table 1. OLS Multiple Regressions Predicting Degree of Protest Intensity by Demographic, State Repression, and Organizational Variables.

Independent Variable	<i>b</i>	β (beta weight)
<i>Demographic Variables</i>		
Education	0.120 (0.172)	0.047
Gender	-0.472 (0.509)	-0.062
Age join	-0.058 (0.032)	-0.120
Year join	-0.023 (0.114)	-0.044
<i>State Repression</i>		
State repression	1.319** (0.443)	0.201
<i>Organizational Ties</i>		
Organizational affiliations	0.593*** (0.157)	0.406
R^2	0.21	
f	8.12***	
N	186	

Note: Standard errors are in parentheses.

** $p < 0.01$;

*** $p < 0.001$.

convincing other sectors to participate via one's own willingness to contribute. Movements operating under nondemocratic regimes especially need to economize on their costs of cross-sectoral communication and mobilization because of government surveillance and the urgency of the situation. They, in part, do this by a division of labor whereby key activists relay information across sectors to large groups of people at once in a single setting instead of waiting for activists to become aware of the same information through a series of individual social interactions over a period of time (Lichbach, 1995). The cross-sectoral activists' stories of other sectors willing to participate become more convincing when they themselves show their confidence in the movement by their own high participation rates.

Table 2. OLS Multiple Regressions Predicting Degree of Protest Intensity by Demographic, State Repression, and Organizational Variables.

Independent Variable	<i>b</i>	β (beta weight)
<i>Demographic Variables</i>		
Education	0.099 (0.164)	0.039
Gender	-0.430 (0.486)	-0.057
Age join	-0.053 (0.030)	-0.111
Year join	0.022 (0.039)	0.042
<i>State Repression</i>		
State repression	1.058* (0.428)	0.161
<i>Organizational Ties</i>		
Organizational affiliations	0.286* (0.118)	0.196
<i>Multi-Sectoralness</i>		
Organizational sectors	0.576** (0.186)	0.224
MSBO membership	1.562** (0.531)	0.225
R^2	0.29	
f	9.14***	
N	186	

Note: Standard errors are in parentheses.

* $p < 0.05$;

** $p < 0.01$;

*** $p < 0.001$.

Members of organizations in multiple social sectors and/or identifying with an MSBO were responsible for coordinating protest events across social sectors and needed to lead by example. To borrow an analogy from the garment making/alteration profession, cross-group activists served as seamstresses or tailors stitching together a wide diversity of organizational fabric into a multi-sectoral quilt of opposition. These structural roles in the opposition's organizational network manifested themselves with higher rates

of participation. In brief, those answering the multi-sectoral call for mobilization (by self-reported higher levels of resistance) were more likely the ones structurally connected to multiple organizations and organizations beyond a single sector. For authoritarian contexts, the structural patterning of organizational linkages may be critical to sustain high-risk collective action by ensuring the kinds of bounded social settings and inter-group interactions that encourage interested individuals to continue contributing to the oppositional movement.

DISCUSSION

This study addressed an important lacuna in the social movement literature: what are the correlates to individual activists sustaining protest participation in exclusive authoritarian political settings where risks to personal safety run extremely high? Under what conditions do individuals actually answer the call to the seemingly idealistic mobilization appeal of regime change that targets a large cross-section of society? The strongest findings in [Tables 1 and 2](#) relate to state repression and organizational membership variables. Those stating military repression as a motivating force to join the popular movement showed higher levels of subsequent protest intensity. In this case, coercive acts by the state unintentionally provided an immediate interest in opposing the government through protest actions. Organizational affiliations also mattered in sustaining that interest in removing the repressive regime by obligating activists to increase their services to the popular movement via participating in collective action.

Why would the number of popular organizational affiliations be positively associated with protest intensity? Every additional popular organizational affiliation would seem to offer countervailing pressure to restrictions that inhibit activism and competing loyalties. Each organizational tie represents a structured normative setting where fellow activists maintain intense face-to-face interaction and reaffirm their interest in democratizing/replacing a repressive government. These obligations are then put into practice by engaging in protest against authoritarian rule. In addition, popular organizational ties increasingly expose individual activists to more militant participants (e.g., members of clandestine or revolutionary organizations) that exercise influence over them directly or indirectly through their affiliated organization's leadership demanding more contributions to the cause.

The nature of organizational participation, though, also made a difference. Those belonging to popular organizations in multiple social sectors and/or identifying with an MSBO demonstrated higher levels of protest intensity. It was precisely persons occupying these roles that would have likely felt a greater sense of shared fate with other social sectors by their participation across social groups. Hence, these multi-sectoral activists had a higher probability of being infused with the energy of the oppositional movement and had success expectations raised by personally witnessing groups from diverse segments of society willing to engage in high-risk collective action. They were also more likely to be the enthusiasts within the movement and needed to “lead by example” to hold moral suasion and authority over less fervent activists and fence-sitters.

CONCLUSION

The overriding importance of structural location within inter-connected popular organizations in inducing protest participation in El Salvador demonstrates the micro-mobilizing functions of multi-sectoral coalitions. Thirty four out of the 36 organizations (92%) constituting El Salvador’s domain of opposition were founded between 1965 and 1980. That is, oppositional leaders and agitators structured social interaction patterns of the movement’s multi-organizational field in a relatively short period in a manner capable of attracting, connecting, and obligating individual citizens across diverse segments of society to resist authoritarian military rule.

This study also has important implications for research on movements struggling against nondemocratic regimes in general. Organizational leaders need to calibrate their mobilization appeals to the degree that people are socially related in their everyday lives or connected through existing informal and formal organizational structures (Gould, 1995). Failing to do so, will likely make persuasive calls to action fall on deaf ears and/or appear unfeasible even to the sectors that are most targeted by the message. Oppositional leaders attempting to shape a multi-sectoral movement identity in authoritarian contexts face particularly stiff obstacles even when a wide variety of groups detest the regime. Civil society is often woefully underdeveloped in terms of associational life, given the repressive circumstances. Civic organizations and trade unions are either banned or closely monitored by government agents. Hence, the establishment of opposition-encouraging organizations is extremely difficult, not to mention the task of constructing bridges between them. It is precisely, however, the work of activists in

creating civic organizations and connecting them to one another that seems to create the kinds of settings necessary for individuals to be willing to engage in high-risk collective action under repressive regimes.

Unfortunately, Salvadorans suffered an additional decade of civil war following the height of the popular movement in 1979–1980 until enjoying the fruits of peace, de-militarization, and substantial regime democratization with the signing of Peace Accords in 1992. Nevertheless, many analysts view this long-awaited positive political outcome in late twentieth century El Salvador as deriving directly from the organization of the popular movement in the 1970s (Paige, 1997; Wood, 2000).

NOTES

1. Several of the most popular protest songs in El Salvador during the 1970s encouraged a multi-sectoral identity such as the Chilean “El Pueblo Unido,” the hymn of the BPR, and several songs emanating from the progressive Catholic Church (e.g., el cancionero *Canta Hermano*). Arguably the most influential protest musical group in El Salvador during the 1970s, *Los Guaraguaos* from Venezuela, arranged and covered songs with mass appeal that focused on each of the popular sectors (such as shantytown dwellers (e.g., *Las Casas de Cartón*), peasants (e.g., *El Campesino*), students (e.g., *¡Qué Vivan Los Estudiantes!*), and church/workers (e.g., *¿Cristo al servicio de quién? preguntaba Jaime Obrero*) as well as songs that emphasized the need for alliances between them (e.g., *Juventud adelante*, *Obrero acepta mi mano*, and *Yo pregunto*).

2. Indeed, Gould (1993, p. 195) states that, “properties of networks should vary widely in their effects on collective action outcomes depending on the structural positions of those who volunteer.”

3. McAdam (1986), for example, found that the number of organizational ties had a positive relationship on individual participation in the high-risk Freedom Summer project during the Civil Rights Movement in the early 1960s, while ties to nonparticipants had a negative effect.

4. In El Salvador, these underground revolutionary parties included the FPL (founded in 1970), ERP (est. 1972), the RN (est. in 1975), the PRTC (est. in 1976), and at times the Communist Party of El Salvador (founded in 1930). These revolutionary organizations combined consisted of a membership of around 500 cadre in early 1980 (Whitfield, 1994).

5. There were at least three early attempts in El Salvador at forming multi-sectoral coalitions. The first attempt was at the end of 1959 when a coalition of university students, labor unions, teachers, and outlawed political parties formed to protest the authoritarian rule of Colonel Lemus and called for competitive elections. This coalition was entitled the Frente Nacional de Orientación Cívica (FNOC) and lasted until early 1961. The latter experiments with a multi-sectoral coalition occurred during two large teachers’ strikes in 1968 and 1971. In the 1968 strike, labor unions, high school and university students, and school parents joined the teachers by

participating in demonstrations and/or holding solidarity strikes. During the 1971 teachers' strike, public educators and their allies formed the Frente de Unidad Popular (FUP), which included teachers, students, and unions in a short-term alliance of organizations. The more formal and enduring MSBOs began to form in 1974 and 1975 including the FAPU and the BPR.

6. At their peak in the late 1970s, the MSBOs had the following estimated membership size: BPR (56,000–80,000); FAPU (8,000–40,000); LP-28 (5,000–15,000); and the much smaller MLP (1,500) (Baloyra, 1982; Montes, 1984).

7. See McAdam (1989) on the use of retrospective surveys for individual movement participation research designs. He partially uses such a strategy to survey former movement participants in the 1964 Mississippi Freedom Summer Campaign about their subsequent political activism. The current study also uses a retrospective survey where recall error may distort the activist's reporting of past events. The survey items were constructed in a way that aided the respondent in recalling the requested information. Most items asked very general information that the individual would not likely forget over an extended period of time such as name of organization, sector of organization, and type of protest action.

8. The mean score for educational attainment was 3.4. This substantively means the average participant had completed primary education.

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APPENDIX. LIST OF EL SALVADOR'S POPULAR ORGANIZATIONAL INFRASTRUCTURE

AEAS	Association of Bus Companies of El Salvador
AES	Association of Secondary Students
AGEUS	General Association of Salvadoran University Students
ANDES-21	National Association of Salvadoran Educators
ARDES	Revolutionary Association of Secondary Students
ASUTRAMES	Association of Market Vendors of El Salvador
ATACES	Salvadoran Association of Agricultural Workers and Peasants
BPR	Popular Revolutionary Bloc
BRES	Revolutionary Brigade of Secondary Students
BTC	Brigade of Rural Workers
CBO	Committee of Workers Neighborhoods
CUS	Unitary Committee of Salvadoran Unions
CUTS	Unitary Confederation of Salvadoran Workers
FAPU	United Popular Action Front
FAU	University Action Front
FECCAS	Christian Federation of Salvadoran Peasants
FENASTRAS	National Union Federation of Salvadoran Workers
FESTIAVTCES	The Federation of Workers in Food, Clothing, Textile, and Related Industries
FSR	Revolutionary Union Federation
FUERSA	Salvadoran Revolutionary Student Front – “Salvador Allende”
FUR-30	Revolutionary University Student Front – 30th of July
FUSS	Unitary Federation of Salvadoran Unions
FTC	Federation of Rural Workers
LL	Leagues for Liberation
LP-28	Popular Leagues – 28th of February
MCP	Popular Cultural Movement
MERS	Revolutionary Movement of Secondary Students
MIPTES	Movement of Independent Professionals and Technicians

APPENDIX. (Continued)

MPSC	Popular Social Christian Movement
MRC	Revolutionary Peasant Movement
MUCAPAS	Association of Salvadoran Musicians and Singers
OMR	Organization of Revolutionary Teachers
STISSS	Social Security Workers Union
STIUSA	Union of United Industry Workers
UPT	Union of Shantytown Dwellers
UR-19	Revolutionary Students – 19th of July

Table A.1. Descriptive Statistics.

Variable	<i>N</i>	Mean	Standard Deviation	Minimum	Maximum
Protest intensity	186	7.0	3.26	1	18
Education	186	3.4	1.27	0	6
Gender	186	0.24	0.429	0	1
Age joined	186	21.0	6.79	10	50
Year joined	186	7.5	6.14	0	37
Repression	186	0.57	0.496	0	1
Organizational ties	186	2.9	2.23	0	13
Number of sectors	186	2.0	1.27	0	7
Broker organization	186	0.68	0.469	0	1