CHAPTER 17

Globalization and Collective Action

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INTRODUCTION

Over the past 30 years, a new form of contention spread across the globe focusing on issues and grievances related to economic liberalization and integration. Besides ongoing ethnic and religious conflicts (Jenkins and Gottlieb 2007; Olzak 2006), economic-based protests may be mobilizing the largest numbers of participants in social movement-type activities. Recent examples abound from the mass-based mobilizations and riots that brought down Suharto in Indonesia in early 1998 in the midst of the Asian financial crisis, to strikes and demonstrations against public sector privatization in China, Colombia, India and South Africa in the early 2000s involving millions of workers, to the rising global food and fuel prices in 2008 driving street protests and disturbances in Bangladesh, Burkina Faso, Cameroon, Egypt, Ethiopia, Haiti, Honduras, Indonesia, Ivory Coast, Mauritania, Mozambique, Peru, Philippines, Senegal, South Africa and even working-class immigrant neighborhoods in Bahrain and the United Arab Emirates. The collective actions are largely defensive in terms of protecting existing rights and subsidies gained in the period of state-led development. This chapter explores the origins and political consequences of this historically emergent form of contention. In particular, I highlight recent literature on (1) the conditions associated with two distinct waves of popular mobilization driven by economic liberalization and (2) the policy and electoral outcomes that this unrest has generated. Specific attention is given to lesser-developed countries (LDCs) in Africa, Asia, and Latin America.

THREATS AND POLITICAL OPPORTUNITIES IN GLOBAL CONTENTION

Tilly (1978) and Goldstone and Tilly (2001) outline two primary incentives stimulating collective action: opportunity and threat. Opportunity centers on the notion that joint action is driven by situations which are more likely to “enhance the contender’s realization of its interests” (Tilly 1978: 133) or gain new advantages (Goldstone and Tilly 2001). In contrast, threat-induced collective action is motivated by negative incentives that would reduce the realization of a challenger’s interests. Political sociologists and social movement scholars have recently recognized that much more analytical attention has been given to opportunity

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generated collective action and government responsiveness than threat-driven mobilization (see McAdam 1999; Tarrow 1998, 2001; Goldstone and Tilly 2001; McAdam et al. 2001, Van Dyke and Soule 2002; Almeida 2003; Snow et al. 2005; Kousis 2005; Alini 2009; Inclán 2009). That is, research has tended to focus on a constellation of factors in the political environment whereby the incentive structure for collective challengers is stimulated by the possibility of acquiring new advantages or what David Meyer (2004) calls "good news" (e.g., new rights, higher wages, more benefits).

Threats are perceived as "bad news" by challenging groups (i.e., taking away existing rights, goods, and safety). Oppositional movements contesting neoliberal economic reforms provide a venue to better understand threat-induced collective action. Three types of threat that influence widespread contention in the developing world include: (1) state repression; (2) erosion of fundamental political rights; and (3) state-attributed economic problems (Almeida 2008a).

Repressive Threats, Loss of Fundamental Rights and Radicalization

For most of the twentieth century, regimes in the global South oscillated between liberalization and repression. Collective actions and social movements often radicalized their strategies and tactics when facing the political threats of liberalization reversals, which commonly involved increasing state violence against organized opposition and the nullification of basic associational freedoms and competitive elections. Especially strong revolutionary movements surfaced in dependent capitalist states ruled by exclusionary and repressive authoritarian governments such as in Angula China, Cuba, El Salvador, Guatemala, Mozanbique, Iran, Mozambique, and Nicaragua (Goodwin 2001; Foran 2005). In the late 1960s and early 1970s, on the eve of the "third wave" of global democratization (Huntington 1991), radical revolutionary type movements ascended throughout the developing world (Wickham Crowley 1991).

Economic-Based Threats, Globalization and State Attributions

While many developing countries that fail to democratize continue to be at the risk of revolutionary mobilization or unarmed insurrections (Schock 2005) driven by repressive threats (e.g., Burma, Egypt, Honduras etc.), in the current period of international economic integration, economic-based threats appear to be mobilizing more groups across the global South. For our purposes, the core threats related to economic liberalization and globalization center on social and economic costs that popular sectors perceive as "collective bads" that should be avoided by engaging in joint action. In a variety of cases and national contexts, policies related to economic globalization and liberalization are often widely interpreted as making subaltern groups worse off if they fail to act collectively, such as the loss of state-sponsored subsidies and services (Eckstein and Wickham Crowley 2003). Especially in terms of material and subsistence needs, oppositional groups jointly construe the policies as imposing new hardships (Shefner et al. 2006). Collective attribution of the negative economic change largely centers on the state as the entity most visible and immediately responsible for implementing economic policy (Jenkins and Klandermans 1995; Javeline 2003). Global economic integration supplies a whole host of state-attributed economic problems and hardships that may instigate campaigns of threat-induced collective action (Roberts 2008; Silva 2009).

Political Opportunities and Democratization

Economic threats alone do not suffice in explaining large-scale collective mobilizations and their outcomes in LDCs. Coinciding with the process of global economic integration over the past 30 years has been the process of democratization in the global South (Markoff 1996). Democratization processes provide "system wide" political opportunities (Meyer and Minkoff 2004) for groups mobilizing around the economic threats associated with neoliberal policy implementation and economic liberalization (Almeida and Johnston 2006). Hence, many countries in the developing world face a "hybrid" political–economic environment[1] of expanding opportunities with democratization (i.e., more institutional access, tolerance of nongovernmental organizations, legalization of oppositional political parties, and competitive elections) combining with the economic threats linked to the globalization process (i.e., rising consumer prices, privatization, loss of access to social services, and welfare state retrenchment). One would expect stronger and more enduring mobilization against economic threats in countries that have transitioned to democratic rule. More groups would have more freedoms to form civil society organizations and align with political parties to sustain collective action than under nondemocratic regimes. International nongovernmental organizations operating in democratic contexts in the Third World would also be afforded more associational freedoms to use their skills and assets for collective mobilizations (Smith and Fetner 2007). In the following section, I examine this particularly potent combination of democratization with economic threats in relation to the upswing in globalization-induced collective action in the late 1990s and 2000s. First, however, I situate categories of economic-based threat within the two stages of structural adjustment executed over the past 30 years.

STAGE I STRUCTURAL ADJUSTMENT POLICIES AND POPULAR RESPONSE (1980–1990)

A global debt crisis emerged by the early 1980s linked to an unprecedented growth in foreign lending, rising interest rates, and falling commodity prices for LDC exports (Schaeffer 2005). International financial institutions (IFIs) stepped in to broker the crisis between northern banks and southern governments. The International Monetary Fund and the World Bank (and its regional banks such as Inter-American Development Bank, African Development Bank, and the Asian Development Bank) negotiated future lines of credit, rescheduled payments and reduced overall debt in exchange for the borrowing countries' willingness to adjust their national economic policy-making in more of a neoliberal fashion (i.e., reduce state price controls and intervention, remove import tariffs, and focus on export production). From 1955 to 1970, only six developing countries had signed such agreements with the World Bank and IMF. In the 1970s, about three countries per year entered into debt rescheduling. In the early 1980s, the number of debt reschedulings in LDCs rose dramatically from 23 between 1981 and 1982, to 65 in 1983–1984 (Walton and Seddon 1994: 13–17). The overall debt also mushroomed in this same time period. In 1970, LDCs owed $64 billion to foreign banks and governments. The Third World debt grew to $686 billion in 1984 and then to $2.2 trillion dollars in 2000 (Walton and Seddon 1994; Robinson 2004). These conditionality arrangements came to be known as structural adjustment agreements between the IFIs and the indebted countries in the global South.

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[1] I thank Sharon Lean for suggesting the notion of a "hybrid" political environment.

Many of the most common economic measures enacted in structural adjustment agreements triggered the largest economic based protests in LDCs during the 1980s. These first stage economic stabilization measures usually focused on fiscal budget austerity, new taxes, currency devaluation, and curtailment of subsidies on basic consumer items (e.g., food staples, cooking oil, and public transportation). The protest campaigns in the first wave of structural adjustment were usually momentary and demanded a repeal of the unpopular economic measures (Auvinen 1997). For example, in Costa Rica in late 1982, the government signed a letter of intent with the IMF that included an escalating increase in consumer electricity rates. The measure went into effect in February 1983. By May 1983, a number of neighborhood-based groups coordinated a national campaign to demand a repeal of the measure and return prices to the December 1982 rates. Roadblocks spread across the major highways and roads of the country in early June until the government decided to negotiate with the movement (Alvarenga Venutolo 2005). In the larger Latin American region as a whole, ten out of the thirteen major campaigns of austerity protest between 1976 and 1987 documented by Walton (2001) involved *price increases* on basic consumer goods and services and nine out of the ten cases were linked directly to an IMF agreement (not counting the Costa Rican case).

Between 1977 and 1992 in North Africa and the Middle East, Walton and Seddon (1994) reported 25 popular outbreaks against structural adjustment in nine countries (Algeria, Egypt, Iran, Jordan, Lebanon, Morocco, Sudan, Tunisia, and Turkey). They state, "In virtually all cases, significant increases in the cost of basic goods and services (or the threat of these) have preceded and effectively precipitated the outbursts of popular unrest" (ibid: 171). In a related study incorporating the universe of major austerity protests in Africa, Asia, Eastern Europe, and Latin America between 1976 and 1987, Walton (1987) found that 19 of the 22 cases (86%) were triggered by dramatic increases in the cost of living. Hence, a large part of the initial austerity protest wave of the 1980s centered on the economic threat of rising prices when subsidies and price controls were removed from mass transportation, basic consumption items, and utilities in order to compensate for domestic budget deficits, trade imbalances, and interest payments on the foreign debt. The liberalization measures marked the end of the era of state-led development and import-substitution industrialization and opened the way to more intensified globalization (McMichael 2008).

Most of these episodes of popular protest were short-lived as responses to the first wave of major structural reform. Democratic transitions were just beginning to take place in the 1980s and national governments placed many political obstacles to prevent oppositional groups from launching longer term nonviolent campaigns against the measures. Many of the campaigns against structural adjustment, especially in Africa, involved violence by both the state and insurgents (Abouharb and Cingranelli 2007) resulting in some cases in hundreds of deaths (Walton and Seddon 1994). Populations were not accustomed to these types of economic measures as governments transitioned to both free market and democratic reforms. Indeed, urban populations in LDCs experienced at least four decades of state-led development before the early 1980s whereby governments expanded fledgling welfare states and increased the subsidization of housing, food, education, health, sanitation, and social services benefiting large segments of the working-class. The shifting political and economic environment, moving unevenly toward economic and political liberalization, pushed entire social movement sectors off balance as challengers experimented with old and new forms of mobilizing strategies to attempt to prevent the unwanted economic changes. In total, Walton and Seddon (1994) identified 146 anti-austerity protests between 1976 and 1992 in Eastern Europe, Africa, Latin America, and Asia. The number of such globalization-induced protests would grow even larger in the late 1990s and 2000s with a second generation of structural adjustment reform.

STAGE II STRUCTURAL ADJUSTMENT POLICIES AND POPULAR RESPONSE (1990–2008)

By the early 1990s, the global debt crisis remained unresolved. For many Third World states, the amount of foreign debt accrued doubled or tripled since the onset of the crisis a decade earlier. Governments continued to sign conditionality agreements with the IFIs – in some cases their third or fourth agreements (Green 2003). The accords negotiated in the 1990s often included many of the conditions stipulated in previous agreements such as the removal of price controls, subsidy cuts, and new taxes. In addition, the structural adjustment packages also demanded the privatization of natural resources, government utilities, pension systems and social services (Pastor and Wise 1999; Kaufman and Nelson 2004; Arce 2005; Tunç 2005). The newer conditionality agreements also often demanded labor flexibility laws that undermined labor rights and collective bargaining (Hershberg 2007). Privatization was also encouraged in the 1980s, but more often in government-run manufacturing industries and state operated enterprises (e.g., steel, mining, textiles, etc.), especially in the larger semi-peripheral and newly industrialized countries of the global South (Williams 2001). The second stage structural adjustment agreements of the 1990s and early 2000s differed by the increasing emphasis on outsourcing the management and provision of basic services, utilities, and natural resources to the private sector and transnational firms.

Empirical studies suggest two distinct waves of global contention over neoliberal economic policies in LDCs. The first global protest wave against economic liberalization (described above) peaked in the mid-1980s and subsided by the mid-1990s (Walton 1998). By the late 1990s, a second wave of economic globalization-induced collective action was ascending, incorporating new demands and grievances (Podobnik 2005; Almeida 2007). Whereas price increases on basic consumer items dominated the list of grievances in the first wave of global contention, privatization related mobilization has often been the largest form of resistance out of all economic liberalization policies in the second wave. For example, in a study of over 280 austerity protest campaigns in Latin America between late 1995 and early 2001, nearly 40% of the campaigns involved grievances related to the privatization of utilities, services, or natural resources (Almeida 2007).

Figure 17.1 displays information on the annual number of protest campaigns in Latin America and the Caribbean between 1996 and 2003 involving issues related to public sector privatization. By 2000, there were over 40 major protest campaigns in the region driven by issues related to privatization, several of which were some of the most immense collective mobilizations in the respective country's recent history such as electricity and telecommunications privatization in Costa Rica (Almeida 2008b), water and natural gas privatizations in Bolivia (Perreault 2006), railroad, telecommunications, and water privatizations in Paraguay, electrical power privatization in Peru, and public health care outsourcing in El Salvador (Almeida 2006).

In another listing of 179 major anti-austerity protests in Africa, Asia, and Latin America by the World Development Movement between late 1999 and 2004, 30% of all reported events were related to a privatization policy.[2] These included massive mobilizations and general strikes in India over banking privatization in 2001, in South Africa over telecommunications, electricity, and water privatization (in 2001 and 2002), in South Korea over the privatization of railroads, gas, and electrical power in 2002, and in Bangladesh over a string of planned privatizations in September 2003. During preparations for the mass strike in South Korea in

[2] See Woodroffe and Ellis-Jones (2000) and Ellis-Jones (2002, 2003) and World Development Movement (2005).



Figure 17.1. Reported anti-privatization protest campaigns in Latin America and the Caribbean, 1996–2003.
Source: Resource Center of the Americas (2003).

February 2002, the leader of the Federation of Korean Trade Unions exclaimed to reporters that, "Public services are the property of the nation. It is not acceptable to sell people's property without their permission or agreement" (quoted Ward 2002). Similar mobilization appeals can be found among labor leaders in Africa and Latin America. Between 2000 and 2004, the World Development Movement also reported large-scale anti-privatization demonstrations and/or strikes in Indonesia, Zambia, Nigeria, Papua New Guinea, Turkey, Lebanon, Thailand, Pakistan, Uganda, and Malawi.

In addition to conflict related to public sector privatization, bilateral and multilateral free trade treaties have surfaced as the latest round of liberalization measures inducing mass protests, potentially leading to a third stage of global adjustment in the early twenty-first century. Since the mid-1980s, the United States has sought out bilateral and regional free trade agreements (FTAs) with developing countries. In the 1990s and early 2000s, the number of FTAs signed between wealthy northern countries (i.e., USA, European Union, Japan, and Australia) and less well-off developing countries picked up pace. By 2006, 25 developing countries had signed an FTA with a more developed nation and over 100 developing countries were involved in free trade negotiations (Oxfam 2007). Regional and bilateral free trade agreements now cover more than 30% of global trade (ibid.). Beginning with the Zapatista rebellion in Chiapas in 1994 over the implementation of the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) (Inclán 2008), a series of protests over free trade treaties have erupted in the 2000s in South Korea, Peru, Ecuador, Uruguay, Colombia, Thailand, El Salvador, Guatemala, Costa Rica, Panama, and Honduras. The challenging groups feel threatened by an entire host of liberalization reforms if the treaties

are approved especially agricultural imports competing with local farmers, loss of labor rights and environmental protections, and the outsourcing of public services and utilities to transnational firms. The Central American Free Trade Agreement (CAFTA) produced two historical mass marches in Costa Rica in 2007 against the agreement, which both reached up to 150,000 participants, the largest demonstrations in recent historical memory (even larger than the mobilizations against privatization in 2000). The anti-CAFTA mobilizations forced the Costa Rican government to hold the first referendum in the country's history on the trade agreement. In Guatemala, in March 2005, students, public sector unions, NGOs, and pan-Mayan indigenous groups sustained a month-long protest campaign nationwide (involving simultaneous roadblocks of major highways and mass marches) as the parliament debated and eventually approved CAFTA.

These newer liberalization measures – privatization, labor flexibility, and free trade accords – are superimposed on the earlier types of austerity policies (e.g., subsidy cuts, mass layoffs, wage freezes, etc.) creating a multiplicity of economic threats that mobilize large numbers of groups in LDCs. Indeed, with an estimated 80% rise in food prices since 2006 (Associated Press 2008), major food protests and riots have been reported in Africa, Asia, and Latin America in 2008, demonstrating that mobilization is not only driven by the second stage economic reforms, but also by the general relaxation in price controls and food subsidies dating back to the austerity measures implemented in the 1980s (Eckstein and Wickham-Crowley 2003; Bello 2008; McMichael 2009).[3]

ORGANIZATIONAL BASIS OF THE OPPOSITION

Collective action is not likely to endure in the absence of organizational assets that connect groups with similar grievances (Jenkins 1983; Edwards and McCarthy 2004). In terms of the social sectors and organizations participating in anti-globalization-related events in the global South, there are two kinds of groups: (1) sectors that were initially established during the period of state-led development (1940–1980) and (2) social sectors that have recently formed with the onset of the third wave of global democracy (1970-present). The state-led development sectors include public sector labor unions, the educational sector, and agricultural cooperatives and groups benefiting from agrarian reform programs. The democratization sectors include nongovernmental organizations, new social movements, and oppositional political parties.

State-Led Development Sectors

Public sector unions have made a formidable presence in the opposition to economic liberalization (Eckstein 2002). They are a grouping, which both are threatened by austerity and privatization measures as well as have the organizational capacity to mobilize against unwanted economic policies. These groups retain organizational and mobilizing skills that were developed decades prior to the onset of the debt crisis. Indeed, most labor unions achieved legalization and reached their organizational zenith during the previous era of state-

[3] The recent outbreaks of protest over the rising costs of food have also been attributed to increasing demand for bio-fuels and the food import needs in the rapidly growing economies of China and India, climatic changes, and rising petroleum prices.

led development and important substitution industrialization (Eckstein 2002; Roberts 2007). Labor sector activists pass down mobilizing skills and organizing templates molded in earlier struggles to newer generations of workers. First and second stage structural adjustment measures threaten many segments of the organized labor force in LDCs. Economic stabilization measures that call for a reduction in government spending in order to reduce budget deficits often involve wage freezes, wage arrears, and mass layoffs in the public sector (Auyero 2006).

Labor unions in government utilities and services undergoing privatization also are threatened with union-decertification and job loss. In addition, labor flexibility laws associated with structural adjustment programs weaken the rights of public sector workers with benefits and collective labor contracts. Such labor flexibility laws often constitute part of structural adjustment agreements in the 1990s and 2000s (Cook 2007). In response to watering-down labor protections, public sector labor unions and federations convened several general strikes and demonstrations in Argentina (1999 and 2000), Colombia (2002), India (2002), Indonesia (2001), South Africa (2000), and South Korea (2002), contributing to the momentum of the second wave of globalization-induced mobilization.

In countries where records of longitudinal strike data exist, over the past 15 years public sector workers have held more labor strikes than in the private sector. This includes the cases of Argentina, Brazil, China, Costa Rica, Ecuador, El Salvador, India, and Paraguay. In Walton and his collaborators' cross-national studies of austerity protests in LDCs, his team consistently finds labor unionization rates as one of the best predictors of high levels of austerity protest (Walton and Ragin 1989, 1990; Walton and Shefner 1994). Javier Auyero's (2002, 2006) rich ethnographic work on anti-neoliberal policy protest in Argentina from a "moral politics" perspective also uncovers that much of the popular contention in the provinces in the 1990s was led or supported by former and current public sector employees that often constitute a majority of the salaried workers in the interior of the country (as opposed to the private sector). In South Korea in the 2000s, the Korean Confederation of Trade Unions (KCTU) coordinated several social movement unionism campaigns with other civil society organizations against privatization, neoliberal restructuring and free trade agreements with Japan, USA, and Chile (Gray 2008).

Lee (2007) finds similar processes in China's rustbelt industries. In 2002, the largest outbreak of social unrest (of any type) since the 1989 Tiananmen Square crackdown occurred in the northeastern province of Liaoning. Tens of thousands of state employees and unemployed workers sustained a week of street demonstrations in the provincial capital demanding owed back wages, pension payments and unemployment insurance. The grievances of Chinese workers largely stem from the dramatic decrease in state-owned enterprise employment from 68.4% of all workers in 1990 to 36.3% in 2003 (Lee 2007: 40). Out of the 58,000 protest incidents documented nationally by the Chinese Ministry of Public Security in 2003, the Ministry estimated that 1.66 million workers participated accounting for 47% of all protest participants, the largest group (Lee 2007: 5). In another study of the second wave austerity protest in Latin America and the Caribbean in the late 1990s and early 2000s, workers participated in 56% of the reported campaigns, and public sector workers participated in nearly a quarter of all campaigns (23.5%), more than any other grouping (Almeida 2007: 129). Podobnik's (2005) worldwide study of 1,178 anti-globalization protest events between 1990 and 2004 found "workers" as the social group with the highest frequency of involvement, participating in 39% of all reported events.

In the educational sector, university and high school students, as well as public school teachers have participated with high regularity in anti-globalization protests. As public educa-

tion expanded at unprecedented levels in the 1950s and 1960s in the developing world at the height of state-led development, so did enrollments in high schools and universities. Austerity measures that affect financing of public universities and the subsidization of public transportation often bring students into popular contention. The high density of university students in large public universities in the mega-cities of the developing world provides them with the organizational capacity for rapid mobilization (Zhao 2001; Zeilig 2007). School teachers have been another educational sector component fighting pension system reforms, wage freezes, and budget cuts in public education (Murillo and Ronconi 2004). In many LDCs, public educator labor associations (along with public health care and hospital worker unions) constitute the largest labor unions in the country with the capacity to launch nationwide mobilizations (Cook 1996). In Central America in the 2000s, public school teachers have convoked some of the largest and most enduring strikes in the region, especially in Costa Rica, Guatemala, Honduras, Nicaragua, and Panama.

Agricultural cooperatives and farmer and peasant associations established in previous decades also participate in mass demonstrations against privatizing communal lands, cheap foreign imports, increasing debt, and the cutting of subsidies from governmental agricultural programs, such as in Costa Rica in the 1980s and 1990s (Edelman 1999), and more recently in Colombia, Ecuador (Guerrero Cazar and Ospina 2003), India, Kenya, Mexico (Harvey 1998; Williams 2001), Pakistan, Peru, Senegal, and South Korea. Peasants also form part of the multi-sectoral coalitions against public sector privatization. In Paraguay, peasant associations act as the "vanguard" in struggles against economic liberalization (Riquelme 2004: 60). Out of the 49 major mobilizations organized by national peasant associations in Paraguay in 2002, 29 related to neoliberal policies, and 18 involved privatization of public sector institutes and services (Riquelme 2004: 61).

Democratization Sectors

The spread of the "third wave" of global democratization increases the potential scale of collective action. While many of the actions in the first upsurge of austerity protests during the 1980s took place in non-democracies or countries experiencing a democratic transition, many of the second stage austerity protests occur in more democratic contexts. Indeed, in the 1980s, Riley and Pafitt (1994) found that austerity protests and riots in sub-Saharan Africa likely sped up the pace of democratization. By the late 1990s and early 2000s, nearly two-thirds of the world could be considered nominally democratic (Puddington and Piano 2005), including West Africa (Umar 2007) and Latin America (Mainwaring and Hagopian 2005). These conditions provide system-wide opportunities (Meyer and Minkoff 2004) for mobilization by multiple groups, including those opposed to negative social aspects of economic reforms (Almeida and Johnston 2006).

Democracies tolerate and legalize more civil society associations and political parties while competitive elections place more accountability on state actors to restrain from repression and potentially respond to popular demands (Tilly 2007). For example, in contrast to studies that predict more social atomization, individuation, and civil society apathy in the face of market reforms and "low intensity democracy," Arce and Bellinger (2007) report in a pooled cross-national time series of mass demonstrations in Latin America between 1970 and 2000, that the interaction of economic liberalization in the context of democratization leads to heightened political contention. Social groups especially benefiting from democratization in

the developing world include nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), new social movements, and oppositional political parties.

Lechner and Boli (2005: 128–132) have identified a massive expansion in international nongovernmental organizations (INGOs) in the twentieth century, from less than 400 in 1909 to over 25,000 in 2000. There has been a concomitant growth in transnational social movement organizations (TSMOs) over the past 50 years, from only around 100 in the early 1950s to over 1,000 by 2003 (Smith 2008: 121–122). Both INGOs and TSMOs fund a variety of local nongovernmental organizations with a multitude of issues and constituencies. These include gender and ethnic discrimination, health care, environmental conservation, and rural economic development, among many others (Harper and Leicht 2007).

While local level NGOs focus their activities on national level economic liberalization policies, they often come under the influence of international nongovernmental organizations (INGOs) where they share ideas, strategies and past struggles against neoliberal reforms (Armbruster-Sandoval 2005; Carty 2006). INGOs assist local movements in the global South build social capital by serving as bridges between domestic-based campaigns and international donor and solidarity constituencies in the global North (McCarthy 1997; Brown and Fox 1998; Bob 2005). Such bridges assist resource poor organizations battling structural adjustment locally to place pressure on international financial institutions and their home governments to alter socially damaging economic policies and development projects (Fox and Brown 1998; Keck and Sikkink 1998). INGOs such as Jubilee South, The Structural Adjustment Participatory Review International Network (SAPRIN), and 50 Years is Enough, partner with dozens of local NGOs in developing countries where they assist in mounting transnational campaigns for debt relief and against future structural adjustment programs. Between 2002 and 2004, environmental organizations, especially those connected to the INGO Friends of the Earth, played a pivotal role in coordinating the multi-sectoral coalition that prevented the continuation of water and sewage privatization in Uruguay (Santos et al. 2006). Regional transnational structures and congregations such as the *Foro Mesoamericano*, World Social Forum, and the São Paulo Forum also play important roles for anti-neoliberal movements to send representatives to share past experiences and plan future actions and collaborations.

Some of the core NGOs fighting privatization and price increases of basic necessities have been consumer-protection organizations (Rhodes 2006). Consumer defense NGOs have rapidly spread from the global North to the global South and appear on the political scene in a number of LDCs. For example, every country on the Central American isthmus has at least one major consumer protection NGO, and the largest network of consumer defense groups in Nicaragua (the *Red Nacional de Consumidores de Nicaragua*) served as the organizational broker in several protest campaigns against water privatization and price hikes in electricity rates throughout the early 2000s.

Local nongovernmental organizations (often funded by INGOs) are rapidly playing a major role in the social movement sector in fighting economic liberalization throughout the developing world (Evans 2005). In South Africa in the early 2000s, NGOs such as the Anti-Privatization Forum and the Soweto Electricity Crisis Committee connected public sector labor unions, community groups, and pensioners in wider coalitions to resist further price hikes and privatization of basic social services (Buhlungu 2006; Egan and Wafer 2006). Governments are beginning to enact restrictions and laws to prevent NGOS from participating in politics (or even legally functioning within their territory) in Russia, Egypt, and Nigeria (Clark and Bensabat Kleinberg 2000). In nondemocratic contexts, NGOs fight an uphill struggle. The Indonesian government under Suharto's rule effectively suffocated an upsurge of NGO activity in export processing industries in the late 1980s and early 1990s via mass arrest campaigns in

the mid-1990s (Jones 2000). Bob and Nepstad (2007) found similar dynamics in Nigeria in the mid-1990s when the military government cracked down on environmental and human rights NGOs in ethnic minority regions fighting the pollution and contamination of their lands in the Niger River Delta by transnational firms. After the repression (arrest and execution of NGO leaders), the Nigerian movement nearly dissolved. Weist (2007) noted parallel processes in the Middle East and North Africa in the 1990s, whereby government suppression of NGOs in Egypt, Bahrain, Algeria, Yemen, Saudi Arabia, Syria and Tunisia greatly reduced their mobilizing capacities. Democratic transitions and more stable democracies provide more space for NGOs to operate and coordinate across regions. Activists often appropriate such fungible NGO infrastructures in mobilizations against economic liberalization measures.

New social movements (that are often sponsored by NGOs) also play an integral part in coalitions resisting neoliberal reforms. New social movements are no longer solely associated with post-industrial societies (Johnston et al. 1994). A plethora of new collectivities exist in the developing world in the early twenty-first century that were largely absent in the era of state-led development. This class of movements would include feminist and women-based SMOs (Liu 2006; Moghadam 2005; Viterna and Fallon 2008; Almeida and Delgado 2008), ecology and environmental movements, movements organized around sexuality and gay rights (Currier 2007), as well as the re-emergence of indigenous people's movements. Participant observers of Argentina's social movements confronting the economic crisis and currency devaluation in 2002 and 2003 found that women frequently accounted for between 50 and 75% of participants in mass demonstrations, which was undergirded by several women's-based NGOs and SMOs (Borland and Sutton 2007). In Latin American countries with large native populations, such as Bolivia, Ecuador, Guatemala, and Peru, indigenous communities have contributed large numbers of demonstrators in protests against privatization and free trade (Van Cott 2007).

Oppositional political parties also make a major presence in mobilizations against neoliberal policy reform Almeida (2010). Here is an excerpt from a report of a street march in El Salvador in later 2001.

> Thousands of workers marched peacefully in San Salvador on November 21 [2001] to protest the layoffs of state workers, privatization of ports and airports, the planned elimination of subsidies for water service, and other government economic policies…The march was led by Legislative Assembly deputy Salvador Sánchez Cerén and San Salvador city council member Gerson Martínez, both of whom are seeking election to the national leadership body of the Farabundo Martí Front for National Liberation (FMLN)[4]

The opposition political party the FMLN has often used its party structure to support anti-neoliberal protest campaigns to oppose neoliberal policies perceived as harmful. Oppositional political parties have played a similar role in Bangladesh against fuel and utility price hikes in the early 2000s. This same pattern has emerged throughout Latin America with opposition parties in Costa Rica, Uruguay, Ecuador and Bolivia using the party structure to mobilize massive social movement campaigns. Van Cott (2003) and Yashar (2005) describe this relationship in both Ecuador and Bolivia, whereby indigenous-based parties such as Pachakutik (MUPP-NP), the Movement Toward Socialism (MAS), and the Indigenous Pachakuti Movement (MIP) served as major coordinators of campaigns against privatization and free trade. In Costa Rica, a new left-of-center political party emerged in the early 2000s to battle official corruption and the dismantling of the nation's welfare state – The Partido de Acción Ciudadana (PAC). The PAC participated in many of the major protest campaigns, including street

[4] *Source:* (Agence-France Presse 2001).

marches, against the Central American Free Trade Agreement in 2006 and 2007 and narrowly lost the 2006 presidential elections.

The relationship between the oppositional political party and social movement has been termed "social movement partyism" (Almeida 2006; 2010). Democratization throughout the developing world over the past 30 years allows more groups to tap into the organizational resources of a political party. Nationalist, populist, and left-of-center political parties tend to be the most likely candidates to enter such a campaign. Dominant parties in power are less likely to enter a partnership with a social movement (Stearns and Almeida 2004), and when leftist parties take power in large cities, they often experience more protest from their erstwhile civil society allies (Bruhn 2008). Several competing leftist political parties sponsored or supported various factions of the unemployed workers' movement in Argentina (the largest in Latin America) during the foreign debt crisis of the late 1990s and early 2000s (Alcañiz and Scheier 2007). In a period of absolute decline in organized labor (Roberts 2007), oppositional political parties are often one of the only organizational units mobilized on a national scale that can offer their organizational assets of membership lists and office equipment to sustain a large-scale social movement campaign against neoliberal policy reform. Detailed case studies and comparative research are often the best strategies to empirically establish this relationship between parties and sectors in civil society (Snow and Trom 2002). Newspaper reports alone often fail to capture the behind the scenes mobilizing roles of groups such as NGOs, new social movements, and the political parties coordinating oppositional campaigns.

The state-led development sectors and the democratization sectors of NGOs, new social movements, and oppositional political parties may provide more precise empirical indicators for examining the likelihood of the timing and spatial variation in globalization-induced mobilization than the earlier "overurbanization" category used by Walton and his collaborators (Walton and Ragin 1990; see also Auvinen 1997). They used the measure as a proxy for a civil society's organizational infrastructure. Some of the key actors and collectivities within the infrastructure are those outlined above.[5] The growing body of scholarship accumulating over the past 15 years would predict more enduring and broader campaigns in societies that have democratized with a civil society characterized by strong oppositional political parties, vibrant public sector unions, large public education infrastructures, and a rich array of non-governmental organizations. At the same time, we would anticipate more violent and short-term protest campaigns (if they arise at all) in nondemocratic contexts (especially those that are not in a phase of liberalization) (see Musa (2008) for the case of Cameroon).

GLOBALIZATION-INDUCED PROTEST OUTCOMES

Movement Level Outcomes

Countries experiencing high levels of popular contention against economic liberalization often "spillover" (Meyer and Whittier 1994) into future rounds of mobilization against neoliberal policies. Negative experiences with economic liberalization provide sentiment pools for the first round of anti-globalization protest. Once communities and oppositional groups are organized and made aware of economic liberalization, they are more likely to participate in

[5] In Walton and Seddon's (1994) more historical and qualitative work, they also discuss many of the groups outlined in this chapter as participating in austerity protests, especially urban-based collectivities such as students, workers, political parties, women, squatter communities, and informal sector workers.

subsequent ~~companies of~~ collective action as societal “demand” against such reforms increases (Klandermans 2004). Arce and Bellinger (2007) found that Latin American countries with later transitions to free market economies (i.e., post 1989), witnessed fewer anti-government demonstrations than countries with a longer term familiarity with liberalization measures. In El Salvador and Costa Rica, the communities, groups, and oppositional political parties that led the battles against privatization of public health care (El Salvador) and electricity and telecommunications (Costa Rica) in the early 2000s were the same groups leading the struggle against the Central American Free Trade Agreement later in the decade. In Argentina, the Central de Trabajadores de la Argentina (CTA) formed in 1993 as a labor confederation of largely public sector workers along with squatters, peasants and unemployed workers (*los piqueteros*). In the late 1990s and 2000s, the CTA coordinated several major nationwide campaigns against austerity programs (including general strikes). In short, the CTA effectively mobilized its affiliates on repeated occasions against austerity policies during the most extreme years of Argentina’s debt crisis. In Bolivia and Ecuador, oppositional political parties, indigenous people’s organizations, labor unions, and students have served as the vanguard of several rounds of anti-neoliberal contention in the early 2000s (Van Cott 2003; Yashar 2005).

Policy Outcomes

A core research question for political studies of economic policy-making centers on if the government enacts the liberalization measure or not. Most anti-neoliberal contention is based on particular economic policies that require parliamentary approval. These liberalization policies include privatization, ratification of free trade agreements, and pension system reforms. At one level, neoliberal reforms are usually enacted with little to mild public opposition from the sectors affected by the impending changes (Hellman 1997). Such macro-level changes characterize the shift from state-led development to the era of neoliberal globalization. During the first surge of policy change in the 1980s, some observers suggested that austerity riots and protests around the developing world resulted in *short-term* victories with prices reduced to end the rioting (Walton and Seddon 1994: 50). Podobonik (2005: 67) reported 54 events in his population of 1,178 anti-globalization protests whereby an IMF/World Bank project or austerity program was eased, delayed, revised, or cancelled in response to popular opposition. Nonetheless, despite some successful campaigns turning back austerity reforms and in a few cases the seizure of state power by anti-neoliberal political parties (Robinson 2008), by the early twenty-first century the developing world remains on a neoliberal trajectory.

For major neoliberal policy programs such as privatization, there is mounting evidence on some of the conditions associated with campaign success in overturning such policies. These conditions include widespread public opinion against the impending economic reform, large-scale mobilization by multiple social sectors, and a strong oppositional political party acting as a friend inside and outside of the polity. Unfavorable public opinion against a particular neoliberal measure often stems from negative experiences with earlier reform measures. If a majority of the general public perceives that the previous neoliberal reforms were enacted in a corrupt or non-transparent matter, they are more likely to oppose future similar reforms. Perhaps even more important, if previous rounds of structural adjustment and privatization resulted in higher consumer prices and a lowering in the quality and access to services, the general public mood will be much more skeptical about other reforms in the legislative pipeline. From this reservoir of public opinion, movement organizers can potentially recruit a larger cross-section of society to participate in particular campaigns against neoliberal policy

enactments. In addition, policy-makers in democratic contexts pay attention to public opinion (Burstein and Linton 2002).

Policy-makers more effectively implemented structural adjustment measures in the 1980s and early 1990s than in the second generation of reform. In the wake of the debt crisis in the early 1980s, LDCs were in a very weak bargaining position vis-à-vis the international financial institutions. In order to prevent more severe economic crisis and receive future lines of credit they needed to enter into conditionality agreements with the International Monetary Fund, the World Bank and related financial institutes (Walton and Seddon 1994). Since the third wave of global democratization was just beginning, many state managers could use their authoritarian legacies to impose socially damaging economic policies despite unfavorable public opinion and/or promise that these measures would be short-term and stimulate future economic growth and prosperity (Stokes 2001a). At other times, presidential candidates would hide their intentions of implementing harsh austerity measures until after taking office (Stokes 2001b).

By the late 1980s and early 1990s, economic liberalization measures were becoming institutionalized in world society as the appropriate strategy to organize developing economies (Babb 2005). This institutionalization can be observed by pro-neoliberal parties adopting free market policies without pressure from the international financial institutions as well as formerly populist, social democratic and democratic socialist political parties in power implementing such measures, such as in Argentina, Venezuela, and Costa Rica in the 1990s. Neoliberal reforms emerged as the new policy paradigm diffusing to would-be emulators in executive offices, economic cabinets and finance ministries throughout the developing world (Weyland 2004).

With growing levels of democracy and mixed levels of economic growth along with enduring social inequality, civil society groups and oppositional political parties began to challenge economic liberalization in sustained campaigns by the mid-1990s. By this time, most LDCs had experienced two decades of austerity-type reforms. Pro-neoliberal governments in the developing world began to use euphemisms for privatization of social services and utilities such as "state modernization" and "anti-monopoly" in order to persuade publics on the need to make the structural economic shifts. One effective strategy adopted by civil society to oppose the second generation reforms involved making horizontal linkages across social sectors.

A multi-sectoral opposition is more likely to lead to a government retracting a reform measure. In privatization cases, the mobilization process usually begins with a public sector union (in the institute threatened by impending privatization) initiating a campaign to halt the process. In many cases, the government will negotiate an indemnification package with labor leaders and no larger conflict erupts. In other cases, the labor union may only launch a campaign against privatization by itself or with other unions in the public sector. Because public sector workers' associations are weakening and concentrated in a few of the largest cities (Barchiesi 2007), their mobilizations will likely be ineffective without the incorporation of several other sectors (Almeida 2008b). Especially effective are umbrella structures that coordinate mobilization among a diversity of groups, including labor, students, peasant associations, NGOs, and oppositional political parties (Schock 2005). Uba (2005) found that such large coalitions that used assertive and economically disruptive protest strategies were more effective in slowing down the pace of public sector privatization in India during the 1990s and early 2000s.

Oppositional political parties play a key role inside the parliament in pushing legislation into implementation (Stearns and Almeida 2004). In the context of anti-neoliberal protest campaigns, oppositional parties vote against neoliberal measures and try to persuade other parties to do the same. These oppositional parties are usually nationalist, populist, socialist, or social

democratic and most likely to enter a coalition with a social movement campaign. Oppositional parties also act outside of the polity by calling on rank and file members to join in collective action. That is, the party's organizational structure is fungible and can be used to mobilize social movement activities by multiple groups as well as voting and electoral campaigning (Almeida 2010). In sum, in the rare case whereby a neoliberal policy is reversed, there will likely be some combination of a majority of public opinion against the measure in question, nationwide mobilization by multiple sectors, and the presence of a strong oppositional political party advocating inside and outside of the polity against the economic reform package.

Electoral Outcomes

Not only have oppositional political parties engaged in anti-neoliberal contention, but they have also benefited from such protests with growing electoral strength. This trend manifests itself most prominently in Latin America during the second wave of globalization-induced mobilization (see Seddon and Zeilig 2005 for the case of Africa). In the early twenty-first century, nearly every left-of-center government in the region can partially trace its electoral success to major protest campaigns against austerity measures, privatization, or free trade policies, including Bolivia, Ecuador, El Salvador, Nicaragua, Paraguay, Uruguay, and Venezuela. The package of IMF reforms implemented in Venezuela in 1989 unleashed a wave of protests, riots, and coup attempts through the early 1990s. Oppositional political parties such as *La Causa Я* and Hugo Chávez's Revolutionary Bolivarian Movement (MBR-200/MVR) blamed the "paquete" for many of the country's social problems (López Maya 1997). These same oppositional parties would grow in force throughout the 1990s culminating in Chávez's electoral victory at the end of 1998 in the presidential elections with his *Moviemiento Quinta República* (MVR) coalition party (López Maya 2005; Gott 2005).

In Uruguay in 2004, the left-of-center *Frente Amplio* party scored an unprecedented triumph in the presidential elections, ending the long dominant system of elite two-party rule by the Colorado and Blanco parties. In the two years prior to the elections, the *Frente Amplio* worked with a coalition of environmental NGOs and public sector unions to halt the process of water and sewage outsourcing to transnational firms. The mobilizations around water privatizations, which largely focused on collecting signatures to petition the parliament for a national referendum, resulted in a plebiscite on water privatization. The referendum and the presidential elections were held simultaneously in October of 2004. Both the anti-water privatization referendum and the *Frente Amplio* prevailed. The water privatization issue likely brought in more of the electorate to vote for the *Frente Amplio* following three years of economic crisis and IMF-sponsored austerity measures. The leftist president of Ecuador, Rafael Correa, came to power in 2006 on the heels of major national mobilizations against free trade by indigenous groups, students, environmentalists, and public sector labor unions. During the presidential campaign, Correa promised the electorate that he would not sign a free trade agreement or a future structural adjustment agreement with the international financial institutions. In Bolivia, Evo Morales' socialist political party (MAS), also won presidential power after two major national mobilizations against natural gas privatization and export in 2003 and 2005 and a national referendum on the issue in 2004 (Postero 2007). The MAS organized these mobilizations as an oppositional party on the road to its stunning electoral victory at the end of 2005.

Similar processes of neoliberal contention converting into political capital for oppositional parties that eventuate in electoral triumphs of left-leaning governments can also be observed in Nicaragua in 2006 (preceded by mass protests against transportation and electricity price hikes) and Paraguay in 2008 (preceded by several rounds of protest against public

sector privatization). In some cases, an entirely new political party or electoral coalition forms in the aftermath of major mobilizations against economic liberalization; this was the pattern in Ecuador in 1995 (Collins 2004), Venezuela in 1997, and Paraguay, Ecuador and Peru in 2006. In other cases, political parties build from the ground up by winning local municipal elections and some parliamentary representation. It is at this level when they are most likely to partner up with social movements to increase their electoral strength. Often, the party-movement coalition coalesces around economic adjustment policies. This pattern has emerged in the early 2000s in Colombia (with the Polo Democrático Alternativo), El Salvador (FMLN), and Costa Rica (PAC). Future lines of research should examine more precisely the contribution of economic liberalization-induced mobilization to electoral outcomes at the local and national levels controlling for other conditions such as clientelism, official corruption, factionalism within traditional political parties, and regional economic structures.

CONCLUSION

Over the past 30 years, two waves of popular mobilization have taken place against globalization. The first wave peaked in the mid 1980s against the initial stage of austerity measures and structural adjustment agreements linked to the Third World debt crisis. The measures largely involved consumer price increases, subsidy cuts on food and basic necessities, wage freezes, and currency devaluations. The protests were largely short in duration and, at times, violent in regimes that had yet to democratize such as several cases in northern Africa. The second wave of protests in the 1990s and early 2000s ascended largely in response to a new stage of structural reforms that included the standard conditionality measures along with privatization and labor flexibility laws. The campaigns challenging the second generation reforms endure over longer time spans and involve deeper policy and electoral consequences that the first wave of contention in the 1980s. With the exception of occasional looting and price riots (Auyero 2007), the majority of second wave mobilizations involve nonviolent and assertive actions in the context of more countries experiencing democratic consolidation. In the absence of a global trend of democratization reversals and repressive state threats that was associated with radicalized collective action in the twentieth century, collective action by popular sectors will likely remain policy-oriented focusing on undesirable economic liberalization measures. In the early twenty-first century, a new upsurge of global contention may be emerging against bilateral and multilateral free trade agreements. In addition, more "traditional" austerity-type protests have re-entered the political scene in the late 2000s over rising food prices.

The tremendous increase in campaigns and social movement-type activities in the developing world confronting the perceived negative social consequences and economic threats of neoliberal reforms presents new challenges to scholarship on the causes and political consequences of popular mobilization in the global South. Models and frameworks designed to explain political mobilization and its impacts in advanced industrialized democracies need to incorporate processes learned in these newer struggles stimulated by global economic integration. Students of collective action would benefit from more research and work on classifying the various forms of economic threats associated with the globalization process and under what conditions they are most likely to mobilize large numbers of people. More comparative research across countries and world regions would also enhance our shared understanding of the composition of the organizational infrastructure in civil society (including transnational civil society) that organizes against economic liberalization reforms and policies. Policy impacts are not exclusively about winning collective goods and new favorable policies

(Amenta 2006), but also involve the ability of mobilized groups to turn back or reverse unwanted policies such as public sector privatization and pension system restructuring. These reforms and their associated mobilizations reach so many segments of the population that the discontent may at times be captured by oppositional political parties to increase their political strength in local and parliamentary electoral bodies and even take executive power.

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